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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ALICE KESLER, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
DAVID 0. KESLER, Trustee of 
the Estate of Alice Kesler; 
DAVID o. KESLER, an indivi-
dual, and HELEN KESLER, his 
wife, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
No. 15520 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
In this matter, Alice Kesler, the Plaintiff-Appellant, 
and the mother of David Kesler, the Defendant-Respondent, 
seeks a judgment from the above entitled Court declaring the 
document marked Exhibit No. P-3, entitled "Warranty Deed", 
invalid, said document purporting to convey a joint tenant 
interest in real property from the Plaintiff-Appellant Alice 
Kesler to the Defendant-Respondent David Kesler. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks to reverse that portion of the lower 
court's verdict wherein said couit held valid the joint 
tenancy deed. The judgment involved in the remainder of 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the case covering the property left in the revocable trust 
was stipulated to. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Alice Kesler, age 85, in the summer of 1971, hired 
Eldon Eliason, attorney at law, to prepare a revocable 
trust for her, naming Alice's son David Kesler as Trustee 
in Trust of said Revocable Trust. Pursuant to the Trust 
prepared by Eliason, Alice deeded certain real property to 
her son David in trust as her Trustee. On September 20, 
1971, Mr. Eliason, while still acting as Alice's attorney, 
prepared a Statement of Withdrawal purporting to withdraw 
certain properties from the Trust, the same to be executed 
by Alice. Said Statement of Withdrawal included, however, 
an additional 640 acres which was never a part of the trust 
property. Alice's testimony indicates that her signature 
appears on the Withdrawal, but that she has no recollection 
of signing the same, or of instructing either her Trustee 
David Kesler or Eldon Eliason, her attorney, to prepare 
the Statement of Withdrawal. The property in the State-
ment of Withdrawal includes Alice's home and two rental 
units, all located in Fillmore, Utah, as well as 640 acres 
of grazing ground located West of Cove Fort, Utah, about 
40 miles south of Fillmore. 
On the same date, to-wit: September 20, 1971, Eliason, 
while still acting as attorney for the said Alice Kesler, 
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did prepare a Quit Claim Deed conveying the same property 
included in the Statement of Withdrawal with the exception 
of the 640 acres, from David Kesler as Trustee, to Alice 
Kesler, Settlor, his mother. David claimed at the trial 
to have no knowledge of the facts surrounding the prepara-
tion of the Withdrawal or the Quit Claim Deed, but admits 
executing the Quit Claim Deed and had custody of it at 
the time of trial. David further stated with regard to both 
documents that he did not give Eliason any instructions 
with regard to the preparation of the same, and Eldon 
Eliason could not recall whether his instructions came 
from Alice Kesler or David Kesler, but thought that they 
came from both. Alice denied giving Eliason any instruc-
tions regarding the transaction. 
On the 5th day of October, 1971, after the withdrawal, 
Alice wrote a letter to David asking that her Fillmore prop-
erty be withdrawn from the Trust. Alice says that she does 
not recall writing said letter, but did indicate that the 
same might have been dictated to her by someone else, but 
was reluctant to tell the court the name of the person who 
dictated the letter. It is interesting to note that the 
letter requesting the property to be withdrawn from the 
Trust was written some 15 days after the execution of the 
Statement of Withdrawal, withdrawing the property from the 
Trust, and the Quit Claim Deed transferring the property 
f~om Trustee David Kesler to Settlor, Alice Kesler. 
-3-
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In July, 1972, Alice Kesler, while David Kesler was 
acting as her Trustee in Trust and while Eliason was still 
Alice's attorney, prepared a Will while the Trust was still 
in effect. Said Will, pursuant to Paragraph 4, Subparagraph 
5, Page 3, gives the bulk of her property to David Kesler, 
her Trustee in Trust, and does not comply with the terms 
as set forth in the Trust Agreement (See Exhibit D-9, and 
Exhibit P-1). 
In August, 1972, Alice Kesler and David Kesler as 
Trustee in Trust for Alice Kesler, commenced an action 
against Joseph Kesler and Calvin Kesler, two of the other 
children of Alice Kesler and Otto Kesler, to recover pos-
session cf certain real porperty from Joseph and Calvin 
Kesler located near Cove Fort, Utah. Said lawsuit was 
partially consummated and Alice Kesler was given posses-
sion and ownership of said property in question on the 
6th day of March, 1973. Shortly thereafter, on or about 
the 9th day of March, 1973, a Warranty Deed was prepared 
by Fred F. Finlinson, attorney at law, conveying all of 
the property covered by the Statement of Withdrawal refer-
red to heretofore herein and marked as Exhibit P-4, from 
Alice T. Kesler to Alice T. Kesler and David O. Kesler, 
Grantees as joint tenants with full rights of survivor-
ship, and not as tenants in common. This deed was also 
!!lade and prepared by Mr. Finlinson while David Kesler was 
acting as Trustee in Trust for Alice Kesler. The testimony 
-4-
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surrounding the Warranty Deed is to the effect that David 
and Alice went first to Eldon Eliason to have him prepare 
such a document, but Mr. Eliason felt that he should not 
prepare such a document for fear that he would be criticized 
because of a conflict of interest. He testified further that 
q 
he though there might be something wrong with him preparing 
such a deed because he purportedly represented Alice Kesler 
in the preparation of the Trust, but also felt an cbligation 
to David Kesler as Trustee of the Trust, and therefor, Eliason 
declined to prepare the deed and he further testified that 
he refused to give any legal advice with regard to the ef-
feet of such a Warranty Deed. 
After Mr. Eliason declined to give any advice or 
represent Alice or David with regard to the preparation 
of the purported Warranty Deed, David and Alice journeyed 
to Salt Lake City to converse with Mr. Fred Finlinson, the 
attorney who subsequently prepared the deed in question. 
Mr. Eliason, while not being willing to aid Alice or 
David in any way in the preparation of the Warranty Deed, 
also indicated by his testimony that he did not refer them 
to any particular attorney, yet they ended up in the law 
offices of the said Finlinson whose signature appears on 
the original Complaint in the action in the lower court 
entitled "Alice Kesler and David Kesler, Trustee, vs. 
Joseph Kesler ar.d Calvin Kesler", bearing the Civil No. 6120. 
Finlinson, however, denied ever putting his signature on the 
Complaint, or knowing it was there, yet attorney Eliason 
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said that if Finlinson's signature appeared on the Complaint 
in question, that Eliason signed the same with Finlinson's 
permission. In any event, there was some connection, if 
not a close connection with regard to the matters involving 
the Keslers and Finlinson and Eliason. Finlinson further 
testified that he was familiar with Alice and David's case 
against Joe and Calvin. Finlinson testified that he ad-
vised both Alice and David Kesler generally as to what a 
joint tenancy deed was, but when asked specifically what 
he told them, he could not recall. In answer to the ques-
tion as to whether or not he told Alice Kesler with regard 
to the deed in question that she could never revoke it or 
recover her property, he said that he had no recollection 
of the question ever being covered, that it never came up, 
nor was it ever discussed. He also indicated that there 
was no discussion with regard to a Will, nor did he give 
her any advice relating to life estates, nor was there any 
discussion with regard to the same. David Kesler had no 
recollection of what was said with regard to the joint tenancy 
deed, except he concluded that Mr. Finlinson was a thorough 
man and that he gave a good explanation of the effect of a 
joint tenancy deed. Mrs. Kesler testified that she had no 
recollection of executing any document in Finlinson's of-
fice, but stated that she went there to discuss the results 
of her case with Joe and Calvin, the same having been final-
ized just two days before the preparation of the Warranty 
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Deed in question, and she further testified that it was 
her concern to know whether or not the joint tenancy 
created between her and her husband, Otto Kesler, was 
valid as determined by the lower court herein and whether 
or not the same would hold up .:i.gainst Joe and Calvin's 
claim on the property at Cove Fort on appeal. 
The only notes that Mr. Finlinson made with regard 
to the transaction are found on ~he bottom of a copy of 
the Warranty Deed in question, which David's attorney 
submitted as evidence to the lower court and the notes 
are quoted as follows: 
"Mrs. Kesler and Dave came in and reported the 
Judge's decision and Mrs. Kesler expressed her deter-
mination that Joe and Calvin may receive nothiag." 
(See Exhibit D-8) (emphasis added) 
Alice further testified that she told her son David 
that she wanted him to have her home in Fillmore (not 
the 640 acres located near Cove Fort or the rental property 
or the vacant lot in Fillmore) described in the Warranty 
Deed, after her death, and not before. She further stated 
that she wanted a Will, and talked to David Kesler about 
a Will. She said that she loved and trusted David, and 
chose him as her Trustee in Trust because she loved him 
and trusted him, and that he W?S the only one that she 
felt that she could trust. She further testified that she 
would have signed anything that David put before her, while 
-7-
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he was acting as her Trustee, and that David did at times 
bring certain documents to her home in Fillmore for her 
signature and that if, in fact, she signed the document en-
titled Warranty Deed that the title was covered up and 
she thought she was signing a Will. 
She was very emphatic in stating that she never in-
tended that David have anything before her death. David 
also testified that she tcld him she wanted him to have her 
home located in Fillmore after her death, that David was 
the only one that said he liked the arrangement and the 
floor plan and that because he said he liked it, she wanted 
him to have it. David's testimony clearly indicates that 
the only property that was ever discussed between David 
and Alice with regard to David having the same after the 
death of Alice, was her home in Fillmore. 
The evidence clearly showed without contradiction 
that Ali~e personally paid from her own funds, all of the 
real property taxes, personal property taxes, maintenance, 
repairs, remodeling (furnace and roof), painting, etc. on 
the rental units. David never paid one penny for any of 
the aforementioned items. The best testimony that David 
could come up with was to say that one time he hauled a 
load of trash to the dump for his mother, using his mother's 
pickup which she gave him at a cost, according to David's 
own testimony, of approximately $4,000.00. 
Alice Kesler testified that all of the proceeds 
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received as rent from the rental units were put in her bank 
account and she spent the money the way that she wanted to. 
She further testified that the money was hers earned from 
l1er rental units which she bought and paid fer, along with 
Otto Kesler, and David had no right to any of the money. 
David agreed to all of these facts in this paragraph and 
the foregoing one. David Kesler further testified that 
he never reported any .income :?:eceived by him on his Federal 
or State Income Tax Return after the purported Warranty 
Deed was made purportedly con'leying a one-half interest in 
the property to him. David f'.lrther testified that he did 
not cause to be filed or advise Alice to file as her Trustee 
in Trust for her, a gift tax return when he obtained the 
purported Warranty Deed from Alice. Alice further stated 
and David agreed, that Alice had a right to mortgage or 
sell the property if she so desired and keep all of the 
proceeds received therefrom without consulting David. 
In fact, a sale was consummated on one of Alice's vacant 
lots located in Fillmore, and the proceeds derived there-
from were deposited to the account of Alice Kesler. The 
money, however, had to be paid back to the purchaser be-
cause Alice could not deliver clear title to the vacant 
lot because it was tied up by her other two sons, Joe and 
Calvin. 
The question way put directly tb David Kesler as 
follows: 
-9-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
"Q: Have you ever paid any taxes on any of these 
properties covered in this Warranty Deed (P-3) ." (emphasis 
added) 
David's answer was as follows: 
"A: Mama has always paid her own taxes on her 
property." (emphasis added) 
Mother testified unequivocally that she thought she 
was signing a Will willing her home in Fillmore to David 
(Not the 640 acres in Cove Fort or the rental units, or 
the vacant lots in Fillmore) , which David was not to get, 
but which was included in the purported Warranty Deed 
(Exhibit P-3) , and that the Will which Alice thought she 
had signed was not to be recorded until after Alice's 
death. She further testified that it was her intent that 
David have her home in Fillmore not immediately, but after 
her death. 
David's testimony indicated that he paid nothing for 
the real property, but that mother told him that he had 
not received as much a.s the others, so he should get more 
$4,000.00 pickup 
yet the evidence-s__hows as given by David, 
/ ' "'\ 
an $11,000.00~wat~~ and bailer, and a 
truck in the spring and summer of 1973, 
after her death, 
that he received 
while acting as Alice's Trustee. David said he felt that 
he had some rights in the property, but he certainly did 
not intend by his testimony to exert such rights until 
after his mother's death. 
-10-
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Reference is made to Exhibit D-7, which further illus-
trates and supports Alice's testimony that she did not in-
tend to give David any present interest in her properties 
in Fillmore or Cove Fort, until after her death, where she 
states the following: 
"At this time I would like all my Fillmore property 
taken out of the trust. I want you to receive this proper-
ty after my death, to use the income of or sale of, as 
you see fit. I am trusting you ... " (emphasis added) 
D-10 was also introduced by the defense to show 
Alice'5 intent, and reference is specifically made to 
that part which the defense relies upon located on Page 
4 of said D-10, wherein Alice states that: 
"We went to all that expense of building the museum 
and Mary and LeGrande and the boys and their wives got 
the whole. benefit. Never have ycu (David) had a break 
with the others, but earned it the hard way." 
It is clear from the letter that the "we" which she 
refers to in building up the museum, was Alice and Otto, 
her husband, and not Alice and David, because David never 
did anything to help build up Cove Fort. He left the 
Fillmore area in 1946 for Montana, and has been there con-
tinually ever since, with the exception of his purported 
numerous trips from Montana to Fillmore to help his mother. 
ARGUMENT 
Point I 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED WHEREIN IT DECLARED THAT JOINT 
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TENANCY WARRANTY DEED WAS VALID. 
There are various and numerous requirements wnich 
affect the validity of a deed. The law covered herein, 
however, relates only to those legal points pertinent 
to the facts in question which affect the validity of 
P-3, the purported Warranty Deed. 
One of the prime requisites required to make a deed 
valid, is delivery, and delivery must be determined by 
the intent of the Granter, taking into consideration all 
of the surrounding facts relating to said deed and the 
preparation thereof. The mere fact that a deed is 
prepared and executed by the Granter and found to be in 
the hands of the Grantee, does not in and of itself, 
constitute a valid delivery. To make the delivery of a 
deed valid, the Granter must intend to transfer to the 
Grantee, irrevocable possession, actual or constructive, 
of the instrument in question, and the Granter must also 
intend that an immediate conveyance of title to the 
Grantee be made according to the tenor of the instrument. 
The important element in all cases of delivery is the 
intention of the Granter and since the intention of the 
Granter is entireley a subjective matter, it must be 
determined by any and all indicia that may logically appear 
to bear upon it, and in all cases, there can be no passage 
of title to the Grantee witho~t a valid legal delivery. 
Other circumstances which make the delivery of a deed 
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invalid which might otherwise be valid, is a mistake on the 
part of the Grantor, and such a mistake may be unilateral 
in nature. Fraud may also nullify the delivery of a deed 
which may otherwise be valid and the fraud may consist of 
misrepresentation as to the nature of the document being 
signed, overreaching, and taking advantage of older persons, 
family members or confidential relationships. 
Undue influence may affect the delivery of a deed. 
The nature of such undue influence which is exercised by 
the Grantee that nullifies the delivery may be the same 
as that which would serve to invalidate a Will. That is, 
the passage of the deed into the Grantee's possession is 
not the result of the real intention of the Granter, but 
of the actions of the Grantee which have in effect im-
posed his own will on the Granter with the result that the 
apparent delivery is rendered invalid in limine. 
A benefit received by a Grantee who stands in a con-
fidential relationship with the Granter, is presumed to be 
the result of fraud and undue influence, and hence invalid. 
In most jurisdictions, when this occurs, the burden 
shifts from the Grantor to the Grantee to prove the fair-
ness and good faith of the transaction. There is obviously 
no presumption in favor of a Grantee in possession of a 
document entitled Warranty Deed of a valid delivery where 
th~re is a confidential relationship, to-wit: a son and an 
aged mother, plus the added fact of a fiduciary relationship 
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to-wit: a sen acting as trustee of an aged mother's estate. 
We have in this case, before the Court, one of the 
most common of all conditional deliveries, to-wit: 
death of the Grantor, as condition of possession and 
delivery. The Grantor here gave possession of the document 
which is entitled Warranty Deed to the Grantee, with the 
intent that any and all rights of the Grantee to the 
occupancy, possession, right to rents, obligation for 
taxes, and title to the property be deferred until after 
the death of the Grantor. In such cases the criteria 
for determining whether or not there has been a legal deli-
very is the intention of the Grantor to convey to the 
Grantee, a present estate in the property during the 
Grantor's lifetime, regardless of the fact of physical 
possession of the deed, if it is the Grantor's intention 
the document made shall not operate to convey any present 
estate to the Grantee until after Grantor's death, the 
deed is held in every case to be ambulatory and testament-
ary in character and hence invalid for want of execution 
as required by the applicable statute of Wills. 
Such facts as occupancy, possesion and acts of dominion 
over the real property become important where the question 
has arised as to the Grantor's intention to make a delivery 
of the deed. Certainly such acts performed by the Grantor 
are evidence of ownership of the property and hence give 
rise to an inference of non-delivery in the instant case. 
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23 Am.Jur. 2d Sec. 6, p. 82, states as follows: 
"Whether an instrument is a deed or will depends 
primarily upon its operation, and not '.lpon its 
form or manner of execution. The essential char-
acteristic of a testamentary instrument is that 
it operates only upon and by reason of the death 
of the maker; during his lifetime it is ambula-
tory and revocable. Hence, the maker by its exe-
cution parts with no right and divests himself of 
no modicum of his estate. It is fundamental, on 
the other hand, in order that an instrument may be 
operative as a deed, that it pass a present in-
terest, although it is not necessar_y_!_hat the 
grantee take a present estate in the property con-
veyed," (emphasis added) 
and further in 23 Am.Jur. 2d Sec. 81, p. 133, it states 
that: 
"The intention of the parties is an essential 
and controlling element of delivery of a deed. 
Intention has been called the 'essence of delivery' 
and not only is it often the determining factor 
among other facts and circumstances, but is 
the crucial test where constructive delivery is 
relied upon. Categorically stated, the rule is 
that it is essential to the delivery of a deed 
that there be a giving of the deed by the grantor 
and a receiving of it by the grantee, with a 
mutual intention to pass the title from the one 
to the other. . " (emphasis added) 
and in 23 Am.Jur. 2d Sec. 82, p. 134, it further states 
that: 
"The intention of the grantor that bears signi-
ficiantly on the question of deliverv is his in-
tention with respect to vestin; the legal title 
of the land in the grantee. To be valid and 
effective, the act of deliverv of a deed must 
be accompanied by the intent that it shall be-
come presently operative as such and presently pass 
title. . . 
Therefore, the inquiry is simplified by asking, 
did the grantor intend the property to pass? .. 
(emphasis added) 
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23 Am.Jur. 2d Sec. 83, p. 135, continues as follows: 
"Since the intent of the grantor is a paramount 
consideration on the question of the delivery of 
a deed, a delivery which will pass title occurs 
only when the grantor parts with his dominion 
over the deed with the intention to pass title." 
(emphasis added) 
In Gilbert v. Mcspadden, (Tex. Civ. App.) 91 SW 2d 
889, the court stated that: 
that: 
"In order to constitute a delivery of a deed, 
the facts and circumstances in evidence must 
show an intention on the part of the granter that 
the deed shall presently become operative and 
effective .... " (emphasis added) 
It is further stated in 23 Am.Jur. 2d Sec. 88, p. 1, 
"In most cases, ... delivery is to be inferred 
from circumstances which by their very nature are 
equivocal and depend upon the subjective state of 
mind of the arantor. In such cases delivery becomes 
a question of fact and cannot be determined as a 
matter of law. This may be true even where the 
deed is placed in the actual possession of the 
grantee. Where the question of delivery is de-
pendent entirely upon intention, it is to be deter-
~ined from all of the evidence bearing upon the 
issue, including the conduct of the parties. The 
questions whether the requisite intent to make 
delivery existed, and whether the granter executed 
his intention to pass title by a sufficient delivery 
are both questions of fact ... " (emphasis added) 
23 Am.Jur. 2d Sec. 89, p. 138, further states that: 
"A sufficient delivery of a deed requires that 
there be a manifestation of the intention of 
the grantor to relinquish all dominion and 
control over the instrument and to have it be-
come presently effective as a transfer of title 
... if he (the grantor) does not evidence an 
intention to part presently and unconditionally 
with the deed (and title to the property), there 
is no delivery." (emphasis added) 
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23 Am.Jur. 2d, Sec. 91, p. 141, states that: 
"It is clear that if the granter hands the deed 
to the grantee pe:::-sonally, W"ithout sayir.g or 
doing anything to qualify the significance of such 
act, an effective delivery is made. Such direct 
change of physical custody with intent to deliver 
has been called 'absolute delivery'. It is 
equally clear, however, that such tranilirof the 
possession of the deed from the granter to the 
grantee must be made with the intention of pass-
ing title. ." (emphasis added) 
23 Am.Jur. 2d, Sec. 100, p. 150, states that: 
"If a deed is executed for delivery only after 
the grantor's death, it is merely a will regard-
less of its name and is valid only when executed 
in the form and manner provided by law for the 
execution of wills. And this is true even when 
physical possession of the deed has been surren-
dered to the grantee, if the grantor did not pre-
sently intend to part with the control thereof 
so as to divest himself absolutely of the title." 
(emphasis added) 
In Henneberry v. Henneberry, 164 Cal. App. 2d 
125, 330 P.2d 250, the court stated that: 
"Even if a deed is manually delivered, but the 
evidence shows that the parties or the granter 
intended the document to become operati•1e only 
upon death, it is testamentary in character, 
and void as a deed." 
23 Am.Jur. 2d Sec. 105, p. 156, states that: 
"Not only must the granter have intended to put 
reclamation of the deed beyond his power, but 
alsc, technically at least, he must have in-
tended that title to the property immediately 
pass to the grantee . 
. . . the issue may be stated as being: Did the 
granter intend to divest himself of his prop~rty 
and to give immediately to the grantee the right 
ta the fee?" (emphasis added) 
23 Am.Jur. 2d Sec. 109, p. 159, further states that: 
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"The controllina factor is the intention of the 
parties, especially the granter, to make delivery, 
and this intention may be inferred from their words 
and acts and from the circumstances preceding, 
attending, and subsequent to the execution of the 
instrument." (emphasis added} 
23 Arn.Jur. 2d Sec. 118, p. 166, further states that: 
"The conduct of both the granter and grantee 
showing exercise of, or failure to exercise, 
ownership and control of the deeded j)roperty, 
also may be indicative of the grantor's intent 
with respect to delivery. The fact that the 
granter continues to exercise acts of owner-
ship and authoritv over the premises, such as the 
collection of rents and profits, or the sale er 
attempted sale of a portion thereof, is inconsis-
tent with the theory of an intentional delivery, 
operative and effectual to pass title." (emphasis 
added} 
In Martinez v. Archuleta, 64 NM 196, 326 P.2d 1082, 
the court said that: 
"Where the granter retains possession and control 
of the property described in a deed intending 
that there i:Je no delivery thereof until after his 
death, the facts that grantee had possession of 
the deed and had procured its recordation do not 
establish <::hat title passed to him." (emphasis 
added) 
POINT II 
EFFECT OF FRAUD UPON THE VALIDITY OF A DEED. 
23 Arn.Jur. 2d, Sec. 142, p. 189, has the following to 
say with regard to frauds effect on the validity of a deed: 
" ... fraud may be presumed from a conveyance by 
a principal to his general agent, who has control 
and management of all his affairs and is his 
confidential adviser and friend." (emphasis added} 
POINT III 
THE EFFECT OF UNDUE INFLUENCE ON THE VALIDITY OF A DEED. 
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Undue influence is a difficult term to define, and 
the determination of undue influence depends upon the 
circumscances of the particular case and therefore makes 
any precise definition difficult. 
thac: 
In Vol. 23 Arn.Jur. 2d Sec. 148, p. 193-194, it states 
"Undue influence has been referred to as a species 
of constructive fraud which the courts will not 
undertake to define by any fixed principles lest 
the very definition itself should furnish a 
guide to the path by which its consequences may 
be evaded. Whether improper influence was exer-
cised must usually be inferred from the facts and 
circumstances of the particular case, such as the 
situation of the grantor and his relation to 
others, his condition of health and its effect 
upon body and mind, his dependence upon, and sub-
jection to, the persons claimed to have influenced 
him, and their opportunity to wield such influence." 
(emphasis added) 
In Pitts v. Hawkins, 264 Ala, 428, 87 So. 2d 835, 
the court, in discussing undue influence, had this to say: 
"In cases of a conveyance of all of one's property, 
where the granter is aged and feeble, only slight 
evidence of undue influence is necessary to in-
validate the deed." 
and in Leuba v. Bailey, 51 Minn. 193, 88 NW 2d 73, the 
court said: 
"The test of undue influence is not its effect 
upon a granter of average intelligence and 
strength of character, but is effect upon the 
person in question, taking into consideration 
his age, intelligence, health, ~nd strength of 
character." (emphasis added) 
POINT IV 
THE EFFECT OF A CONFIDENTIAL RELATIONSHIP UPON THE VALIDITY 
OF A DEED. 
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Referring to the effect cf a confidential relationship 
and the effect of the validity of a deed, Vol. 23 Am.Jur. 
2d Sec. 149, p. 195, states that: 
that: 
"The existence of a family or a confidential or 
quasi-confidential relationship between the 
grantor and the grantee in a deed is an 
important factor in determining the presence 
of undue influence in the execution of the deed, 
especially if it appears that the beneficiary 
was in honor bound to prefer the interests of the 
donor to his own. It is not the relationship 
itself, but rather the ab•.ise of it, that con-
stitutes undue influence. Where a confidential 
relationship operates to cause the substitution 
of the will of the grantee for that of the grantor 
in a deed, the deed may be avoided. 
Such relationship exists between . 
child,. principal and agent . 
parent and 
. Where a confidential relation is shown to 
exist between the parties to a deed and where the 
grantee, who is the beneficiary, is the dominant 
spirit in the transaction, the law raises a pre-
sumption of ~ndue influence, or. as is sometimes 
said, a deed is prima facie voidable in such a 
~·" (emphasis added) 
Vol. 23 Am.Jur. 2d Sec. 154, p. 198, further states 
"Where a confidential relationship is shown to 
exist between the parties to a deed, and where 
the grantee, who is the beneficiary, is the dominant 
spirit in the transaction, the law raises a pre-
sumption of undue influence, or as is sometimes 
said, the deed is prima facie voidable in such case. 
This imposes upon the grantee, or the party con-
tending that the deed should be upheld, the burden 
of repelling that presumption and cf proving the 
fairness of the transaction and that the deed 
was not obtained by undue influence. It has been 
said that to sustain t~e burden of proof cast 
upon him when a presumption of undue influence 
exists, the arantee must show in the clearest and 
most satisfactory manner that the conveyance is 
one which is, in every particular, worthy of 
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receiving the sanction of a court of equity. 
Stated differently, the presumption of inva-
lidity of a deed due to fiduciary relationship 
may be overcome by clear and convincing evi-
dence that the transaction was fair, volun~, 
and free from any taint of fraud, coercion, or 
overreaching. 
Applying these principles, where there is a 
presumption of undue influence on the part of a 
child, che grantee in a deed, as against his 
parent, the grantor, the child (grantee) must 
show that the parent acted upon competent and 
indeoendent advice of another or must show such 
facts as will satisfy the court that the deal~ 
was at arm's length or that the transaction was 
had in the most perfect good faith on his part 
and was equitable and just between the parties." 
(emphasis added) 
POINT V 
THE EFFECT OF A MISTAKE ON THE VALIDITY OF A DEED. 
Relating to the effect that a mistake has on the 
validity of a deed, 23 Am.Jur. 2d, Sec. 155, p. 202, 
states that: 
"Although a deed in terms expresses the intention 
of the parties, if there is a material mistake 
as to the property to which those terms apply, 
such as to its identity, situation, boundaries, 
title, amount, value, and the like, a court of 
equity may qrant appropriate relief. Mistake as to 
the quantitY of land in the tract conveyed is 
remediable in equity, even to the extent of set-
ting aside the deed. 
. . . Relief from mistake in a deed may be granted 
in proper cases even though the mistake ~­
lateral as distinguished from a mutual mistake, 
and a mistake of law may be relieved against when 
~ttended by misrepresentations, undue in~luen7e, 
misplaced confidence, or some other special cir-
cumstances justifying interposition of eauitz." 
(emphasis added) 
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POINT VI 
THE EFFECT OF A UNILATERAL MISTAKE UPON THE VALIDITY OF 
A DEED. 
23 Am.Jur. 2d, Sec. 156, p. 203, regarding the 
effect of a unilateral mistake on the validity cf a deed, 
states that: 
" ..• It is generally agreed that equitable 
cancellation may be decreed on the ground of a 
material mistake made by one party only to a 
deed, including material mistake as to identity, 
situation, boundaries, title, or amount of land 
to be conveyed. A deed may be canceled for a 
unilateral mistake on the part of the granter 
which renders it inequitable for the grantee to 
have the benefit thereof, even though the par-
ties dealt at arm's lehgth and on an equal foot-
ing and the grantor was negligent, if his mistake 
was not a breach of duty." (emphasis added) 
POINT VII 
LEGAL ASPECTS FOR DETERMINATION OF WHETHER IT IS A DEED 
OR A WILL. 
23 Am.Jur. 2d, Sec. 176, p. 221, states that: 
... So far as general principles are concerned, 
wnether an instrument is a deed or ~ill depends 
primarily upon the intention of the maker of the 
instrument, which may be evidenced by the manner 
of execution and the characteristics of the in-
strument, and, in the final analysis, upon the 
manner in which the instrument is to operate. 
It is fundamental that while possession or enjoy-
ment of an estate may be deferred, a deed to be 
operative must pass a present interest, whereas 
an instrument testamentary in character operates 
only upon and by reason of the death of the maker, 
who, by its execution, parts with no rights and 
divest himself of no modicum of his estate . 
. . . The general test, therefore, is as to when 
the instrument is to take effect as a conveyance 
of the property described or of any interest there-
in." (emphasis added) 
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In First Securitv Bank of Utah v. Burgi, 251 P.2d 297, 
122 Ut. 445, a case involving a deed and bill of sale exe-
cuted by a father in favor of a son, said documents being 
executed during the father's lifetime but the delivery and 
validity of the same being questioned after the father's 
death, and the questions being raised as to whether or not 
the document which was entitled a deed, was in fact a deed 
or a will, the court stated the following: 
"The testimony reveals that the deceased clearly 
intended that the deed and bill of sale pass the 
property to the defendant. The facts and circum-
stances, however, support the trial court's finding 
that the deceased had no intention to pass title 
immediately, but that such deed and bill of sale 
were to become operative upon the ·death of the de-
cedent. Under such circumstances the deed and bill 
of sale were clearly testamentary in character, 
and intent and were inoperative since they did not 
conform to statutory requirements for testamentary 
disposition. In re: Alexander's Estate, 104, 
Utah 286, 159 P.2d 432." (emphasis added) 
In Stanley v. Stanley, 97 Utah 520, 94 p.2d 465 (1939), 
an earlier case which involved a deed recorded after the 
death of granter, it appeared that subsequent to its exe-
cution the alleged granter separated from his wife, the 
grantee, and that the said granter exercised all the in-
dicia of ownership of the property conveyed, such as re-
deeming the property from tax sales, mortgaging it with 
the knoweldge of the alleged grantee, collecting rents, 
paying taxes, etc. and the court held admissible in evi-
dence testimony in the course of these various transactions 
that he had repeatedly stated that he was the owner of the 
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property and that the deed in question.because of the acts 
of ownership on the part of the grantor,was void. 
?OINT VIII 
FIDUCIARY RELATIONSHIP 
In discussing a fiduciary relationship similar to the 
one in this case, the court in Merritt v. Easterly, (1939) 
226 Iowa 514, 284 NW 397, said: 
"A grantee who acted as the general agent and 
gua!:dian in fact of his aged and infirm aunt 
at the time she made deeds of gift to him 
has the burden of proving affirmatively that 
he took no advantage of her by reason of their 
relationship and that she acted voluntarily, 
with freedom, intelligence, and full knowledge 
of the facts." 
In another case similar, the court stated that: 
"It is presumed that a deed from an aged grantor 
in favor of one who is her farm supervisor and 
close friend is the result of fraud and undue 
influence because of the confidential relation-
ship and places upon the grantee the burden of 
proving the contrary." McNeill v. McNeill, (1943) 
223 NC 197, 25 SE 2d 615. 
Again, in Jones v. Boothe, (1960), 270 Ala, 420, 119 
Sc. 2d 203, the court said: 
"In transactions inter vivas where the parties 
stand in confidential relationship and the 
grantee who is the beneficiary, is the dominant 
spirit in the transaction, the law raises a 
presumption of undue influence and casts upon 
the grantee the burden of repelling such pre-
sumption by satisfactory evidence." 
and again, in Hilliard v. Shellabarger, (1949) 120 Colo. 
441, 210 P.2d 441, the court said: 
"It is an error of law to place upon the party 
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asserting it, the burden of proving fraud and 
undue influence where the parties to a deed 
stood in a confidential relationship. The bur-
den is on the beneficiary of the transaction to 
prove that it was fair, just and equitable." 
and in 13 Am.Jur. 2d, Sec. 64, p. 541, it states: 
"A party seeking cancellat'con of an instrwnent on 
the ground that its execution was brought about 
by undue influence, must prove this fact but his 
burden of proof is aided by application of a 
theory that the existence cf a confidential 
relationship raises a presumption of the exer-
cise of undue influence, and the party denying 
that the instrument in question was produced by 
undue influence has the burden of refuting that 
presumption especially where the transaction is 
#ithout consideration or is in the nature of a 
gift to him. 
. . . the preswnption being always against the party 
having superior dominant influence or control." 
(emphasis added) 
Considering the law and the facts as set forth herein, 
equity and conscience dictate that the purported deed in 
question cannot be a valid one, and the most that can be 
said for it is that it is testamentary and ambulatory in 
nature and fails to comply with the applicable statutes 
relating to Wills. 
Obviously, a confidential and fiduciary relationship 
existed between Plaintiff Alice Kesler and her son, the 
Defendant David Kesler. Alice was about 80 years old 
when David became her Trustee in Trust of her entire 
estate. Alice testified that David, her Trustee in 
Trust, was one person she could rely upon and put her 
trust in, yet after David became Trustee in Trust, in 
the swnrner of 1971, he had by the summer of 1973, become 
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the proud possessor of a swather and bailer valued at 
$11,000.00, and a truck valued at about $4,000.00, which 
was purchased with Alice's money and for which she makes 
no claim. David has by his acts, attempted to take from 
his mother, while acting as her Trustee, an undivided 
interest in joint tenancy in her home. Alice did not 
give it to David. Alice testified that it was her intent 
to give her home in Fillmore to David by Will after her 
death, but David attempted to take not only the home by 
deed, but all her property located in Fillmore, Utah, 
plus an additional 640 acres located approximately 40 
miles South of Fillmore, near Cove Fort, the additional 
Fillmore property and the property near Cove Fort having 
never been discussed in any way between the two of them 
even as a testamentary gift. 
The most important security that elderly have is the 
security of knowing that they own their home, which they 
have struggled for, bought and paid for, during their 
lives. The security in knowing that no one can take their 
home away from them or kick them out of it any time they 
desire. David, however, desires to take that security and 
peace of mind from his mother and Truster, in spite of 
what her intent was at the time she executed the purport-
ed deed, thinking it to be a Will and in spite of what 
his mother's intent is now, leaving his mother unsure of 
her own home and insecure in the ownership and peaceful 
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possession thereof. He further desires to take from his 
mother,while acting as her Trustee, an undivided interest 
in her rental units in Fillmore, Utah, which is the main 
source of her income, thereby causing her financial in-
security. Alice's testimony is clear, and David offered 
nothing to refute her testimony, with regard to the fact 
that the only thing that was to be made a gift to David, 
after Alice's death, was her home. David lived for a 
period of a month or more, right in the home of Alice's 
while she was having troubles with Joe and Calvin, and 
while there he told her how much he liked the arrangement 
of her home, and it was at that time that Alice told 
David that she wanted him to have her home after her 
death because none of the other members of her family 
had indicated that they cared for the arrangement of 
the home at any time, and just two days after part of 
Alice's troubles with Jee and Calvin were settled, David 
ends up with a deed to the property in question. What 
more can be said, other than David took advantage of his 
80-year old mother while acting as her Trustee in Trust 
and induced her or tricked her into deeding her property 
to him by pretending to like her home and pretending to 
help and protect her from Joe and Calvin. 
David says that the reason Alice gave him the 
property was because he had not received as much as 
the other children of Alice and Otto Kesler during his 
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lifetime, and that he not only felt justified in taking 
the property from Alice as a gift, but now feels that he 
is entitled to keep it even after he has heard from Alice's 
own lips what her true intentions were. This argument 
of David's might be valid if it was being used against 
the other heirs after Alice's death, but to use it 
against his own mother, to force her into making a gift to 
him during his lifetime, strikes at the very center of 
the conscience of the most petrified heart, and equity 
should not allow such a deed to stand. 
This case differs from most of those cited in this 
brief, because Alice is still alive and well and able to 
tell the court what her true intent was when she signed 
what she thought to be a Will, and her intent is clear 
and unequivocal, to-wit: That David was not to get any 
interest in any of the property owned by her until after 
she had died and then he was only to get an interest in 
her home. 
In determining Alice's true intent, the law tells 
us that we must look to all the facts and circumstances 
surrounding the transaction, both before and after the 
date of the questionable deed. Alice testified she talked 
to David about a Will, not a deed. She testified and 
David offered no evidence to contradict her testimony, 
that she paid the rea~ property taxes on the 640 acres, 
as well as on her home and the rental units. She further 
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testified that she paid the maintenance and upkeep on 
her home and rental units, that she paid for all the 
major repairs on everything covered in the deed, that 
she maintained insurance on the property at her own cost 
and expense, that she collected rents on the rental units 
and kept the units rented, that she spent the money re-
ceived from the rent as she saw fit; that she had the 
·(lower and right to sell the property, and in fact did 
sell a vacant lot included in the questionable deed lo-
cated in Fillmore, and all, not one-half, of the funds 
received from the sale of the lot went to Alice's bank 
account. None of the proceeds from the sale went to 
David. Alice further testified that she had a right to 
mortgage the property. David, in answer to a question 
about who paid the real property taxes, said, "Mama has 
always paid her taxes on her property." 
This unequivocal, unguarded statement from David 
certainly shows David's true intent with regard to the 
ownership of the property, to-wit: Alice owned it and 
it was her responsibility to pay the taxes on her property. 
David testified that h.e thought he had some right in the 
property, but at the present time he did not intend to 
exert that right, that he thought that he should wait until 
his mother was deceased to exert such a right. This 
testimony certainly shows what David's intent, as well 
as his mother's intent was, to-wit: No property interest 
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should pass to David until his mother's death. 
To furtner show the true intent of the transaction, 
David testified that he never reported any income, either 
Federal or State, on his tax returns at the time the pur-
ported deed was made. The reason given was that it was 
meant to be a gift. Yet, David did not, while acting as 
Trustee for Alice, cause to be filed a gift tax return for 
her, thereby evidencing the fact that the transaction 
was not to be presently effective, but that the property 
covered by the purported warranty deed was in total to 
remain in and be a part of Alice Kesler's estate, up un-
til the time of her death. Note also that Alice and 
David, at all times, had legal counsel to advise them, 
but none advised them with regard to taxes and the effect 
of a joint tenancy warranty deed. 
Let's look now for a moment at the legal advice that 
Alice got regarding the effect of a joint tenancy warranty 
deed. Eldon Eliason testified that he refused to give 
any advice with regard to the deed, that he would have 
nothing to do with the preparation of the same. His ex-
cuse being a conflict of interest because he drafted the 
Trust. Fred Finlinson, the attorney who prepared the 
purported deed, really couldn't remember specifically 
what he told Alice and David, but thought he advised her 
about joint tenancy deeds in general, but when asked 
specifically if he told Alice that she could not get her 
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property back, he replied that he did not think that the 
subject came up. Certainly it would be Mr. Finlinson's 
responsiblity to bring such a subject up. Mr. Finlinson 
further testified that he did not advise her that she was 
parting with a present interest in her property, to-wit: 
her home, and certainly Alice would have recalled if Fin-
linson would have said to her, "Hey, Alice, you're giving 
one-half of your home to David right now, today. Do 
you want that now, or wait until after your death?". Ob-
viously, the question was never asked. It is a compliment 
to say that Alice received even poor advice, at best. The 
law is clear that Alice, when making a gift of her property 
in joint tenancy or otherwise, should receive and is entitled 
to receive, competent independent legal advice which is un-
derstandable to her and this is especially true where the 
Grantee in the deed is to be the beneficiary thereof and 
where the Grantee is a son and a Trustee in Trust holding 
a confidential and fiduciary relationship with the Granter. 
Finlinson testified that a Will was never discussed, 
and that he never inquired about the balance of her estate 
and never advised her about a life estate or any alternative 
that she might take other than making a warranty deed 
with regard to her property. Finlinson did, however, in-
dicate that he was knowledgeable of her problems with 
Calvin and Joe and it is further interesting to note that 
the only written memorandum that Finlinson made with regard 
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to what transpired in his office on the date the alleged 
deed was prepared by him, related to Alice's problems 
with Joe and Calvin, which is precisely what Alice testified 
that she went to Mr. Finlinson to talx about, to-wit: 
the validity of a joint tenancy deed between Alice and her 
husband, Otto Kesler, which had just been determined and 
upheld by the lower court two days before David got his 
parsimonious hands on the putative warranty deed. David 
offered no direct testimony to controvert what Alice said 
her true intent was at the time the reputed warranty deed 
was signed by her, to-wit: to make some kind of a gift to 
David to take effectonly after Alice's death. Neither 
could David provide the court with any extrinsic evidence 
to show that her intent was different than Alice testified 
it was. 
David, when he accepted the position as Trustee for 
Alice, owed her the highest duty required by law, equity 
and conscience - to avoid even the mere semblence of over-
reaching or unfair treatment, and David could not at trial 
show by his own testimony or by the testimony of others 
who he called to testify on his behalf, that the deed made 
between he and his mother creating the joint tenancy was 
what she intended, or that it was a fair transaction or 
that she was independently and properly advised. In fact, 
David took Alice to see Attorney Finlinson. 
The law presumes the existence of fraud, overreaching, 
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and undue influence where such a relationship of trust and 
confidence exists between two people, as it existed between 
Alice and her son, and Alice testified and David did not 
deny the fact, that she signed papers in her own home 
which David brought to her. In fact she testified that 
the document in which David claims a one-half interest in 
Alice's property was misrepresented to her by David in 
that she thought she was signing a Will and that the 
part of the document which she signed which showed it's 
title, to-wit: Warranty Deed, was never shown to her at 
the time that she signed said document. She testified 
further, however, that it really didn't make any difference 
because she trusted David and would have signed any docu-
ment which was put before her by David for her signature. 
This is the very essence of the law which requires the 
shifting of the burden from the Plaintiff-Appellant-Grantor 
to the Defendant-Respondent-Grantee, to show that the 
transaction was beyond question a fair, equitable and 
conscienable transaction, and David certainly failed to 
prove such in the instant case. 
Alice testified unequivocally that her intent was to 
sign a Will leaving her home, only, to David after her 
death, but in fact the doucment she signed, thinking it to 
be a Will, turned out to be a warranty deed. The law is 
clear that a unilateral mistake on the part of the Granter 
as to the nature of the document that she is signing is 
-33-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
grounds to void the document, in this instance, the deed. 
The law further allows the recision of a deed in cases 
where the granter makes a unilateral mistake as to the 
amount of property conveyed or as to the particular proper-
ty conveyed. Again, in the instant case, ~here was no 
intent on the part of the Granter, Alice, to convey any 
property but in any event, there was not even any intent 
to execute a Will leaving any property to David after Alice's 
death, except her house, and certainly if the document 
which she intended to sign had been a Will, she would have 
been entitled to revoke that gift during her lifetime. Here 
again, Alice relief upon David to obtain the property des-
cription to put in the Will, and she had a right to rely 
upon him because he was her Trustee and he failed her. 
And even if the document in question, (and we do not 
acknowledge for one second that she intended to sign a 
deed) , had been a deed wherein Alice intended to convey 
only her home in joint tenancy to David, the deed should 
still be set aside because of the unilateral mistake on 
the part of Alice thinking that the document covered only 
her home. 
Alice further testified that she had difficulty in 
ready even the big words on the documents, to-wit: Warranty 
Deed, at the top of the page, and that she could not read 
the fine print in which the description was made. In any 
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event, even if she could have read the descriptions, she 
could not recognize the same and relied upon David entirely 
to make an honest and fair deal according to her intent. 
Thus, the unilateral mistake, as to the nature of the 
document and the amount of property to be conveyed, 
coupled with the relationship of the parties being con-
fidential and fiduciary in nature, is further grounds for 
setting aside the putative deed. 
CONCLUSION 
There was no intent on the part of the Granter, Alice 
Kesler, at the time that she executed the document entitled 
"Warranty Deed", to pass an immediate present interest in 
the title to her real estate in question. Her intent was 
to make a testamentary gift of her home only to David to 
take effect at the time of her death, and not before, 
and therefore the deed is void as such because of a lack 
of intent to pass a present interest in the property and 
thus delivery of the same is ineffective and incomplete. 
The document is further void as a Will because it fails 
to comply with the applicable statutes relating to Wills. 
The purported deed is further void for the reason of 
fraud and undue influence exerted upon Alice by David while 
acting in a confidential and fiduciary relationship with 
her, thereby shifting the burden from the Plaintiff-Appel-
lant Alice to the Defendant-Respondent David to prove that 
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the transaction was unquestionably a fair one, which bur-
den the Defendant-Respondent failed to meet. 
The deed is further void for the reason that a unilateral 
mistake was made on the part of the Granter Alice, with re-
gard not only to the nature of the doucment which she was 
signing, to-wit: her intent was to make a Will, not a deed, 
and also as to the amount of property whcih was to be in-
cluded in the document whch she was signing was in excess 
ofthe amount which Alice intended. 
From the foregoing facts and law, it obviously appears 
that consicence, equity, and fair and honest dealings dic-
tate and require that the deed in question be declared void 
and of no validity whatsoever and that Alice Kesler, the 
Plaintiff-Appellant herein be restored to the ownership of 
her property as described in the purported deed and that 
David Kesler, her son and former Trustee, be required to 
return to her by execution of a warranty deed, all of her 
property which he now holds a joint interest in with her, 
pursuant to the purported deed in ques~ion, and that said 
acts on David's part should be consummated forthwith, and 
~he judgment declaring said deeds valid should be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted 
z -
- BYRON L. STUBBS 
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